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I. INTRODUCTION
It is now easy to see, in the light of Adam Smith's Lectures on Jurispru-
dence, that The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations
were parts of a grand system. Nonetheless, TMS and WZVare not tightly
linked. This paper pursues the following strategy: knowing that Smith
wrote both works, one can go back to TMS, investigate Smith's handling
of the virtues, and see how that work implicitly defended the acquisitive,
commercial society analyzed so thoroughly in WN.1 In doing so, it will
be shown that Smith has a distinctive, key, narrow handling of the virtue
justice which is based upon the passion resentment. Smith's treatment
of justice explains why there can be no concept of just price in Smith's
work. It serves to support market, flexible, or negotiated prices as
ethically legitimate because it effectively removes market prices from the
domain of government control or responsibility, at least insofar as
government is enforcing justice. It will be seen that Smith views prudence
as a virtue. He sanctifies self-interest with the appellation of virtuousness,
and provides a virtuous underpinning to the logic of acquisitive, self-
interested commercial society where everyone to some extent is a mer-
chant. Moreover, Smith is relatively unconcerned with avarice. He does
Connecticut College. I wish to thank J. Alan Winter, Lester J. Reiss, Dirk Held,
Reverend Eddie Kjelshus, James Alvey and especially the editor for their helpful comments
and advice.
1. One can view TMS and WN as separate pillars of an intellectual construction which
has no superstructure. Or, perhaps better: one can view WN and TMS as originally being
flats in a partially finished three story building. WW was on the third floor, resting upon
LJRP on the second floor, which rested upon TMS on the ground floor. Then, Smith took
WN off the third floor and put it on the ground by itself. The partially built second floor
was then demolished, and WN and TMS were further developed as independent free
standing intellectual abodes.
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not address Aristotle's fear that the use of money to make more money
generates the cancerous growth of avarice in society. This lacuna is odd
and significant since Smith's general understanding of the virtues seems
to be so influenced by Aristotle.2 Smith's handling of the virtues of
justice and prudence (and his lack of handling of avarice) facilitates moral
acceptance of acquisitive commercial society. Hence, in this sense there
is no "Adam Smith problem" of a radical inconsistency between Smith's
two major works; indeed, the doctrines in The Theory of Moral Sentiments
provide an ethical defense for the commercial society discussed in The
Wealth of Nations.
Nevertheless, the paper argues that this study of Smith's handling of
the virtues at best provides only a partial resolution of the Adam Smith
problem. Key differences in the two texts remain, including divergent
references to the divine Being, and general writing styles. These dif-
ferences are held to result partly from differences in the subject matter,
and from different anticipated audience reaction to the works. The paper
concludes by suggesting that Smith may have wanted to keep the TMS and
WN quite separate, and not link them up by publishing a book on jurispru-
dence. One grand theoretical system could become too unstable, fragile,
and easily overthrown. Moreover, Smith may have taken to heart his own
cautions against men of system and extravagant ambition, and he knew
when to leave well enough alone.
II. JUSTICE, THE JUST PRICE, AND
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES
For Smith, the virtue justice is special. Justice is based upon the
passion resentment. As with most3 passions, a person can have too much
or too little resentment. A person with too little resentment is mean-
spirited: "A person becomes contemptible who tamely sits still, and
submits to insults, without attempting either to repel or to revenge them.
We cannot enter into his indifference and insensibility" (ibid., pp. 34-5).
2. The links between Aristotle and Smith on the virtues will hopefully be developed
in another paper. Here, note that for both Aristotle and Smith, a) there are a lot of
various virtues (Urquhart 1993); b) for each virtue there appears to be two vices: one
of excess, and one of deficiency; c) there are a lot of various passions or emotions; d)
virtue is a characteristic, a relation to the emotions; e) selected combination of virtues,
vices, passions and emotions tend to get bound up into various character types, with
important implications for rhetoric and communications (Aristotle 1991; Smith 1983).
On the relationship between Aristotle and Smith on justice see Berns 1994.
3. Probably all passions. See Aristotle 1962 whom Smith seems to follow. For
Aristotle as for Smith, not all the passions have names.
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This want of proper indignation (lack of resentment) is a most "essential
defect in the manly character" (ibid., p. 243). However, too much resent-
ment is called fury and leads to unwarranted revenge. The correct,
moderate amount of resentment, if guarded and qualified "may be
admitted to be even generous and noble" (ibid., p. 38).4
Resentment is a protective passion. It is never properly called forth
but by actions which tend to do real and positive harm to some particular
persons. Resentment is given to us by nature for defense. "It is the
safeguard of justice and the security of innocence" (ibid., p. 79). It
encourages fear in others. That action which appears to deserve punish-
ment is the proper and approved object of resentment. Moreover, "resent-
ment cannot be fully gratified, unless the offender is not only made to
grieve in his turn, but to grieve for that particular wrong which we have
suffered from him. He must be made to repent and be sorry for this very
action, that others, through fear of the like punishment, may be terrified
from being guilty of the like offence" (ibid., p. 69). Hence, resentment
prompts us to punish. The violation of justice is injury; "it does real and
positive hurt to some particular person, from motives which are naturally
disapproved o f (ibid., p. 79). Violate justice, and you are exposed to
resentment, and deserving of punishment, the natural consequence of
resentment.
Smith makes the claim that "the rules of justice are the only rules of
morality which are precise and accurate" (ibid., p. 327). "The principles
upon which those rules either are, or ought to be founded, are the subject
of a particular science, of all the sciences by far the most important, but
hitherto, perhaps the least cultivated, that of natural jurisprudence" (ibid,
p. 218). These rules of justice are indispensable. Mere justice may be
upon most specific occasions, a negative virtue which "only hinders us
from hurting our neighbor" (ibid., p. 82). Yet the system of justice, is
"the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice. If it is removed, the
great, the immense fabric of human society... must in a moment crumble
to atoms" (ibid., p. 86). Smith here can be interpreted as responding to
Montesquieu's assertion that a republic must rest on political "virtue"
(meaning love of the homeland, love of equality) and that a monarchy
must rest on honor (1989, Book 3). Smith says no, in general, all societies
must simply rest upon justice alone.
Smith then makes a crucial theoretical move. He claims that there is
a "remarkable distinction between justice and all the other social vir-
4. This is reminiscent of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean (1962, II.5-O.9, and III.6
to the end of Book V).
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tues.. .that force may, with the utmost propriety, and with the approbation
of all mankind, be made use of to constraint us to observe the rules of
the one [justice], but not to follow the precepts of the other [all other
virtues]" (ibid., p. 80). Who first made this distinction? Smith writes
that it was made "of late.. .by an author of very great and original genius"
(ibid., p. 80). Some think Smith is referring to Hume. The editors of
the Glasgow edition of TMS think it was Lord Kames, although they
puzzle how anyone, even Adam Smith, could call Kames "an author of
very great and original genius" (ibid., p. 80 fn. 1). Recent work by Knud
Haakonsen suggests that the distinction was originally made by the
Prussian jurist Samuel von Cocceji (1679-1755).5 Haakonsen argues that
Cocceji's work "is the basis for Smith's sharp distinction between legal
justice and the rest of morals. He [Smith] maintains that justice is a
necessary and, in extreme (presumably temporary) circumstances, a
sufficient condition for civil society" (1996, p. 146).
Smith's handling of justice shows why there is no just price for Smith.6
Smith's narrow definition of justice means there can be no just price in
the sense of a price set or administered by the government. Smith wants
to reserve the idea of justice to objects of resentment which impartial
spectators feel should indeed be punished if violated. This ethical position
allows for market or flexible or negotiated prices. For Smith, people have
a right to justice; they have a right to not be injured. Yet, they do not
have a right to charity or generosity. They do not have a right to pur-
chase anything at a given set price. As opposed to e.g. Aristotle, justice
does not call for the fixing or administering of prices (Aristotle, 1962,
5.5). Smith's narrow conception of justice removes market prices from
the compass of government control or responsibility, at least insofar as
government is enforcing justice.7 His conception of justice opens up the
space for commercial society, and fluctuating market prices. Prices are
the product of exchange, of higgling, of bartering, of voluntary, legitimate
5. See Haakonssen 1996, ch. 4.2-4.3. This appears to be the first study published
in English on the relationship between Smith and Cocceji. In The Lectures on Jurispru-
dence Smith is recorded as saying that many of Cocceji's works "are very ingenious and
distinct, especially those which treat of laws" (Smith 1978, p. 398).
6. Although Smith may with some justice be called "the last scholastic." On the
relationship between the scholastics and Smith see Lapidus 1986, "Premiere Partie."
7. In general, Smith is trying to free himself from the terminology of commutative
and distributive justice (see Smith 1976a, pp. 269-70). In practice, Smith did not totally
ignore the concerns of what others called distributive justice (Young and Gordon 1996).
Young and Gordon interpret Smith as continuing and developing the natural law tradition
from Aquinas to Hutcheson (see, for example, Young and Gordon 1992).
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actions; they are outside of the domain of justice. Hence, there can be
no just price for Smith.
There are two caveats to the above. Government can set prices or
control prices, as with the prohibition of usury. Yet, here the government
acts in the name of what Smith calls police, or economic policy. Hence,
for example, usury rates could be prohibited in the name of economic
policy to promote economic goals; which Smith advocated. Yet, for
Smith, they would not be prohibited in the name of justice.8
However, I think the problem for Smith is more complicated than the
above implies. Consider times of scarcity, famine, skyrocketing food
prices, starvation. Would the common people have a right to food at
maximum food prices, i.e., at a food price ceiling? Smith's silence on
this issue seems to mean no, you cannot force someone to sell food at a
certain rate. High food prices cannot be the proper objects of resentment.
Yet, in fact, people have been known to get resentful at high food prices.
E. P. Thompson, for example, in his articles on the moral economy of
the English crowd in the eighteenth century (1993) argues that the crowds
were defending what they considered to be traditional rights and customs.
They were upset, they "resented" the high food prices which came with
famines. This "moral economy of the poor" (ibid., p. 188) legitimated
political arguments, fights against high famine prices, and actual punish-
ment for those who charged unduly high prices.
Thompson claims that Adam Smith' s economy " entailed a de-moralising
of the theory of trade and consumption" (ibid., p. 201). Thompson is
basically correct, but the culprit is not Smith's economy so much as it is
Smith's ethics and jurisprudence. Smith's theory of justice restricts
government actions in the name of justice to objects of resentment, and
Smith's silence suggests that he thinks high famine prices are not the
proper objects of resentment. Nevertheless, empirically, high prices were
no doubt an object of resentment for large segments of the poor, as
Thompson documents. A conundrum presents itself: where is the impar-
tial spectator to adjudicate these various claims to proper resentment?
Who is correct: Adam Smith's lack of resentment at high famine food
prices, or the resentment of the protesting crowds? The answer is not
clear.
Again, note that by Adam Smith's system, the government could set
maximum food prices in the name of police, or economic policy, but not
8. Smith argued in favor of the prohibition of usury on the grounds that it would
discourage projectors and the misallocation of scarce resources. See Pack 1991 pp. 55-6;
see also Levy's interpretation (1987).
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in the name of justice. Indeed, Adam Smith argues against this course
of action in his "Digression concerning the Corn Trade and Corn Laws"
(1976b, IV.v.b). Now, it may be that Smith's economics, or "police" is
faulty. It could be that in times of famine high prices impoverish the
poor, they spend all their money, sell all their liquidable assets and then
die needlessly (Sen 1981, pp. 161-2). At one point Thompson makes that
argument, says that "riot and the threat of riot may have staved off
starvation" and argues, only partly in jest, that the best things affluent
countries "can do to help the hungry nations is to send them experts in
the promotion of riot" (1993, p. 302). Here Thompson (following Sen)
employs an argument for maximum food prices in the name of "police,"
economic policy. This is not an argument embedded in the terrain of
justice.
III. PRUDENCE AND SELF-INTEREST AS VIRTUES
Consider now Smith's handling of prudence and self-interest. In
response partly to the overly ascetic doctrines put forth by Mandeville
(1976a, p. 313), Smith holds that "we love ourselves surely for our own
sakes" (ibid., p. 171). For Smith self-love may frequently be the motive
of virtuous action. In fact, even a tradesman "who does not bestir himself
to get what they call an extraordinary job" is called poor-spirited (ibid.,
p. 173). Moreover, "carelessness and want of economy are universally
disapproved of.. .from a want of the proper attention to the objects of self-
interest" (1976a, p. 304). A person should take proper care of his health,
life and fortune. People must not act only from benevolence in trying
to help others. They must also take care of themselves. This is called
prudence; prudence is a virtue.
For Smith, "the care of the health, of the fortune, of the rank and
reputation of the individual, the objects upon which his comfort and
happiness in this life are supposed principally to depend, is considered
as the proper business of that virtue which is commonly called Prudence"
(ibid., p. 213). Again: "Regard to our own private happiness and
interest, too, appear upon many occasions very laudable principles of
action. The habits of economy, industry, discretion, attention, and
application of thought... are very praise-worthy qualities" (ibid., p. 304).
An important aspect of prudence is self command. Various facets of
self command may also be distinct virtues in their own right. For
example, "in the command of those appetites of the body consists that
virtue which is properly called temperance.. .to confine them within those
limits, which grace, which propriety, which delicacy, and modesty,
require, is the office of temperance" (ibid., p. 28). The virtue prudence
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consists primarily of the union of superior reasoning and self command.
"The qualities most useful to ourselves are, first of all, superior reason
and understanding, by which we are capable of discerning the remote
consequences of all our actions, and of foreseeing the advantage or
detriment which is likely to result from them; and secondly, self-com-
mand, by which we are enabled to abstain from present pleasure or to
endure present pain, in order to obtain a greater pleasure or to avoid a
greater pain in some future time. In the union of those two qualities
consists the virtue of prudence, of all the virtues that which is most useful
to the individual" (ibid., p. 189). Superior reason and understanding "are
originally approved of as just and right and accurate" (ibid., p. 181). We
feel they are right and accurate; they appear to be right and accurate. Of
course, that does not meant that they are.9
Mere imprudence is a vice; it is "the mere want of the capacity to take
care of one's-self' (ibid., p. 216). As always for Smith, we disapprove
of vice, and approve of virtue. "In our approbation of the character of
the prudent man, we feel, with peculiar complacency, the security which
he must enjoy while he walks under the safeguard of that sedate and
deliberate virtue" (ibid., p. 264). Prudence may even stimulate more than
approval; it may excite admiration. In the "practice of frugality, industry,
and application though directed to no other purpose than the acquisition
of fortune," Smith holds, "we not only approve, therefore, but in some
measure admire his conduct, and think it worthy of a considerable degree
of applause" (ibid., p. 190).
Smith holds to a hierarchy of virtues. While beneficence is "the
supreme virtue," mere prudence also is a virtue. Prudence "when
directed merely to the care of the health, of the fortune, and of the rank
and reputation of the individual, though it is regarded as a most respect-
able and even, in some degree, as an amiable and agreeable quality, yet
it never is considered as one, either of the most endearing, or of the most
ennobling of the virtues. It commands a certain cold esteem" (ibid., p.
216). Nonetheless, prudence is a virtue. Its vice counterpart, impru-
dence, when combined with other vices, makes a person hateful, con-
temptible and vile (ibid., p. 217). Prudence itself, when combined with
other virtues is called superior prudence: "Wise and judicious conduct,
when directed to great and nobler purposes than the care of the health,
9. See Griswold 1991, 1996 for excellent discussions of Smith's sceptism. Griswold
claims that "in theorizing about ethics Smith enacts Sceptism. He may therefore be
interpreted as following out Hume's Sceptical program to its limit, and perhaps as doing
so more consistently than Hume did" (Griswold 1991, p. 228).
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the fortune, the rank and reputation of the individual, is frequently and
very properly called prudence. We talk of the prudence of the great
general, of the great statesman, of the great legislator.... It is the best head
joined to the best heart. It is the most perfect wisdom combined with the
most perfect virtue. It constitutes very nearly the character of the Aca-
demical or Peripatetic sage" (ibid., p. 216).
Smith's insistence on prudence being a virtue sanctifies self-interest with
the appellation of virtuousness. Smith presents a worldly philosophy
which okays, approves, encourages, legitimizes a certain degree of self-
interest. His sanctification of self-interest and self-love is compatible with
commercial society. For Smith, in commercial society everyone is to
some degree a merchant: making deals, bargaining, trucking, persuading,
pursuing their self-interests and attempting to take care of their worldly
material needs. Smith's understanding of prudence as a virtue provides
a virtuous underpinning to the logic of acquisitive, self-interested commer-
cial society.
IV. AVARICE, AMBITION, AND COMMERCIAL SOCIETY
This virtuous underpinning is strengthened by Smith's relative inatten-
tion to a problem which concerned Aristotle: the ability of money making
to become an end in itself. Let us now consider the passions of avarice
and ambition. Smith defines ambition as follows: "Those great objects
of self-interest, of which the loss or acquisition quite changes the rank
of the person, are the objects of the passion properly called ambition; a
passion, which when it keeps within the bounds of prudence and justice
is always admired in the world" (ibid., p. 173). Reasonable ambition is
admirable. For Smith, the passion avarice is simply petty ambition:
"objects of avarice and ambition differ only in their greatness. A miser
is as furious about a halfpenny, as a man of ambition about the conquest
of a kingdom" (ibid., p. 174). According to Smith, ambition tends to
over-rate the difference between a private and a public station in life.
Avarice tends to over-rate the difference between poverty and riches.
Both are or can become "extravagant passions." Both are a great source
of "the misery and disorders of human life" (ibid., p. 149). Nonetheless,
Smith nowhere dwells upon the problems caused by these passions.
This lack of concern is particularly noteworthy with regard to avarice.
Aristotle (who was a major influence on Smith's ideas about the virtues)
was concerned that in a commercialized, monetarized society the pursuit
of money would tend to become an all-consuming passion. The use of
money to make money, the fact that people could make a profit from the
buying and selling of commodities, would become a goal and end in itself.
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For Aristotle, the use of money to make more money knows no limit; this
mode of acquisition tends to become an all-consuming passion (Pack
1985).10
Aristotle's fear that commercial society would unleash the passions of
avarice and greed is nowhere addressed by Smith. At one point Smith
does say about the miser (versus the person of exact economy and assidu-
ity), "The one is anxious about small matters for their own sake; the other
attends to them only in consequence of the scheme of life which he has
laid down for himself (1976a, p. 173). The fear that commercial society
may induce this miserliness, the spectre of Dickens' Scrooge who becomes
concerned only with his own greed (1991) is a nonissue for Smith." His
silence is significant.
V. VIRTUES AND THE ADAM SMITH PROBLEM
Smith's handling of the virtues justice and prudence, and his relative
neglect of avarice and of the Aristotlean argument that the use of money
to make money unduly encourages the passion of avarice, gives moral
support and justification to acquisitive commercial society. It gives space
for flexible, market or negotiated prices outside of his narrow conception
of justice based upon proper resentment; it encourages and legitimates the
pursuit of self-interest in society through virtuous prudence; and it ignores
possible moral problems due to avarice encouraged by commercial society.
In these senses, not only is there no "radical inconsistency between TMS
and WN" (Raphael and Macfie 1976, pp. 24-5), the doctrines put forth
in TMS provide an ethical defense for the commercial society discussed
in WN.
Nonetheless, in some fundamental ways, this is only a partial resolution
of "the Adam Smith problem." The editors of the Glasgow edition of
TMS are not quite correct when they say that the Adam Smith problem
is a "pseudo-problem based on ignorance and misunderstanding" (ibid.,
p. 20). There do seem to be real differences in the feel and texture of
these two works. These differences include but are not limited to differ-
10. See also Lowry 1987, chapter VIE and Lewis 1978.
11. As it is with Smith's great friend David Hume. For Hume, avarice does not seem
to be much of a societal problem, does not seem to be related to commercial society in
any particular way, and should probably be treated more with humor than with gravity.
See his essay "Of Avarice" (Hume 1987).
available at http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1053837200004715
Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Library, on 12 Dec 2016 at 16:22:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
136 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT
ences in writing style (Kleer 1993; Brown 1994)12 and differences in
references to a Divine Being (Viner 1928; Minowitz 1993).
One critical source of these differences is the subject matter of the two
books. For the most part, TMS is ahistorical: it deals with moral senti-
ments which arise out of the general nature of humans. Moreover, for
the most part, society is not split into social classes over issues concerning
our moral sentiments. On the other hand, for the most part, WN is
historically specific. As is clear from Smith's Lectures on Jurisprudence,
Smith was keenly aware that commercial society grew up at a certain point
in time. Moreover, society is split up into social classes with diverse,
often opposing interests. Two results follow from this.
For the most part, in dealing with aspects of humans which are ahistori-
cal, which do not change with history, Smith will talk about "the great
Director of Nature," "the final cause," "the Author of Nature," "the
divine Being," etc. These are basically synonyms used by Smith to denote
the origins of human "hardware," or structures of the human being which
are historically invariant (Smith wrote before the ages of computers or
French structuralism). This is why readers will find these terms in TMS,
with the significant exception of Part V, "Of the Influence of Custom and
Fashion Upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation."
It is also why these terms are largely absent in WN. These terms general-
ly do not appear in areas of Smith's texts dealing with historically specific
human attributes.
Regarding writing style, Smith held that if confronting a friendly
audience, one should use what he called an Aristotelian style. Begin with
a proposition and set it out roundly before the audience. Affirm the things
you are to prove boldly at the beginning since the audience is already
inclined to agree with your conclusions (Smith 1983, Lecture 24). This
seems to be the writing style of TMS. Smith anticipated no large, orga-
nized, class-based or otherwise opposition to his theory of moral senti-
ments. Hence, he seems to have used this kind of harsh, unmannerly,
direct approach.
The writing style of WN generally seems quite different. Smith held
that if confronting an unfavorable audience, one should use what he called
a Socratic style. Do not shock the audience by rudely affirming what they
12. Brown argues that TMS is a dialogical text whereas WN is monologic due to the
differences in the subject matter: TMS being a moral text, whereas WN is an amoral text.
See Kleer's (1993) cogent critique of Brown's position, and his emphasis that the differ-
ence in writing styles between the two texts seems to have more to do with problems of
persuasion.
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will find disagreeable. No, conceal your design, begin at a distance, bring
them slowly to the main point. This way your audience will gradually
agree to your various positions and gently, eventually arrive at your
ultimate conclusion (ibid.). Smith felt he was making a "very violent
attack.. .upon the whole commercial system of Great Britain" (Smith 1977,
Letter 208, p. 251). He knew he had a potentially large unfavourable
audience. He expected his book to be controversial. For these reasons,
he seems to have used what he called the Socratic style. The style of WN
is generally smooth and flowing; it reads quite differently from TMS.
With the publication of the student lecture notes on Smith's jurispru-
dence class, it is now easy to see that TMS and WN were parts of one big
system. The TMS ends with the promise to continue Smith's discourse
onto justice and jurisprudence. The latter part of the Lectures on Jurispru-
dence deals with the police, or economic policy of commercial societies;
i.e., it deals with the subject matter of WN. It is often regretted that
Smith was not able to, or did not have the time to complete his theoretical
system, linking up TMS and W7V.13
I think the hypothesis needs to be entertained that a part of Smith per-
haps did not want the two books tightly linked up. Certainly, if that was
a driving concern of Smith, then he would not have spent the last years
of his life working in the government's tax department.14 He warned
against "the man of system" (1976a, pp. 233-4).15 Yet, what was Smith
himself, but a man of two systems? There was the system of "natural
liberty" and economics proposed in WN, and the system of moral senti-
ments based on sympathy in TMS. Smith could have linked them up, no
doubt through working out of the concept of resentment, and the develop-
ment of the family, private property and the state through the course of
human history. But for what end? A system too tightly linked up, too
bound together becomes unstable, fragile. Take out, discredit, destroy
one piece and it may all fall apart.
Perhaps a part of Smith felt it would be better to leave his two systems
apart. Let each stand alone; let neither support each other in one magnifi-
cent grand system, nor come to rely upon each other for their own internal
validity. If this is the case, then the Adam Smith problem will always
13. See for example Ross 1995, p. 414.
14. Smith received his Commissionership of Customs and Commissionership of Salt
Duties January, 1778 (the appointment was probably made November 1777 (Rae 1965,
p. 321)). The last board meeting Smith attended was April 9, 1790 (Ross 1995, p. 403);
he died July 17, 1790.
15. Smith apparently criticized Boswell for "acting upon system." See Viner 1965,
pp. 32-3.
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remain, or rather it can be only partially resolved. Moreover, it was a
problem which Smith himself to a certain extent decided to create. The
subject matter of the two books was quite different. The anticipated
audience reaction to the two books was quite different. One tight system
can become unstable and too easily overthrown; why bind them together
into a magnificent synthesis? Why have too much scholarly ambition?
"Examine the records of history, recollect what has happened within the
circle of your own experience, consider with attention what has been the
conduct of almost all the greatly unfortunate, either in private or public
life, whom you may have either read of, or heard of, or remember; and
you will find that the misfortunes of by far the greater part of them have
arisen from their not knowing when they were well, when it was proper
for them to sit still and to be contented" (ibid., p. 150). It may be that
Smith himself knew when to stop.
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